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ABSTRACT
Attacking Computer Vision Models using Occlusion Analysis to Create Physically
Robust Adversarial Images
Jacobsen Loh

Self-driving cars rely on their sense of sight to function effectively in chaotic and uncontrolled environments. Thanks to recent developments in computer vision, specifically convolutional neural networks, autonomous vehicles have developed the ability
to see at or above human-level capabilities, which in turn has allowed for rapid advances in self-driving cars. Unfortunately, much like humans being confused by simple
optical illusions, convolutional neural networks are susceptible to simple adversarial
inputs. As there is no overlap between the optical illusions that fool humans and the
adversarial examples that threaten convolutional neural networks, little is understood
as to why these adversarial examples dupe such advanced models and what effective
mitigation techniques might exist to resolve these issues.
This thesis focuses on these adversarial images. By extending existing work, this
thesis is able to offer a unique perspective on adversarial examples. Furthermore,
these extensions are used to develop a novel attack that can generate physically robust
adversarial examples. These physically robust instances provide a unique challenge
as they transcend both individual models and the digital domain, thereby posing a
significant threat to the efficacy of convolutional neural networks and their dependent
applications.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Autonomous vehicles have made rapid developments in recent years, moving from
science fiction to reality. Though numerous technologies can be thanked for spurring
these significant jumps towards a future with self-driving cars, perhaps no contribution has been greater than that of deep learning-based vision [1].
In a world built for and navigated by humans, the ability to see is of utmost importance. Until the last decade, the field of computer vision lagged well behind human
performance and therefore struggled to be used in real-world applications; however,
with the advent of convolutional neural networks and deep learning, computer vision
has evolved from an error-prone technology to a tool with state-of-the-art capabilities
exceeding those of a human [2].
From obstacle avoidance [1] to traffic signs [1], deep learning has given autonomous
vehicles the eyes needed to navigate the world safely. Computer vision models are
evolving to ensure they adapt to the needs of the real world.
In safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles, it is essential that safe
operation can be guaranteed at all times. Errors by any component, including software, can produce disastrous consequences such as the loss of human life, which has
already occurred during tests on public roads. Thus far these failures have only
been the result of momentary lapses in performance, typically resulting from poor
driving conditions. Therefore, the thought of an adversary deliberately attacking an
autonomous vehicle’s vision systems should be of great concern, as a malicious actor
could quickly wreak havoc [3]. While significant research has already been conducted
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in various fields critical for autonomous vehicles, there is insufficient research in the
realm of adversarial attacks against computer vision systems.
It turns out researchers have already identified vulnerabilities in computer vision
systems (see Chapter 3). Of particular interest is the potential for an adversary
to craft images that can confuse and mislead a model, similar to how humans are
confused by optical illusions. These images, known as adversarial examples, vary from
attacks modifying only a single pixel to attacks generating perceptible perturbations.
Originally, these adversarial examples were primarily of interest to researchers for
their ability to help illuminate the inner-workings of convolutional neural networks
rather than as legitimate security concerns; however, in the past few years, researchers
have discovered that these adversarial examples can be designed in such a way that
they can exist the physical world (see Section 3.2). Perhaps even more concerning is
the ability for these adversarial objects to be appear innocent while actually being
catastrophic to computer vision models. This confirms the threat of adversarial examples, as it is now possible for an adversary to produce malicious objects that can
be used to deliberately confuse and mislead models.
With these realizations, it is essential for researchers to discover the full potential of
these attacks and develop effective defenses to ensure the security of safety-critical
applications. Though significant work has already been done, there is still much to
do before control can be fully relinquished to these systems.

1.1

Contributions

This thesis explores adversarial attacks against computer vision systems, in particular
their application towards autonomous vehicles. Aside from summarizing the literature
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pertaining to adversarial examples, this thesis reproduces existing work and makes
novel contributions. Specifically, the contributions are:

• An in-depth study of the Fast Gradient Sign Method first proposed by Goodfellow et al. [4].
• A discussion of the limitations of the Robust Physical Perturbations (RP2 )
attack pipeline developed by Eykholt et al. [5].
• Using occlusion analysis, introduced by Zeiler et al. [6], a novel attack is proposed

1.2

Chapters

The organization of this thesis is as follows:

• Chapter 2: Background—A presentation of technical concepts fundamental
to this thesis.
• Chapter 3: Related Works—A literature review of early adversarial examples, physically robust adversarial examples, and potential defense mechanisms
to these attacks.
• Chapter 4: Tools—A brief overview of the hardware, software, and data sets
used in the development of this thesis.
• Chapter 5: Fast Gradient Sign Method—An overview of the Fast Gradient
Sign Method, as well as in-depth discussion and results that extend existing
work.
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• Chapter 6: Physically Robust Perturbations—An overview of the Robust
Physical Perturbations (RP2 ) attack pipeline and a discussion of its limitations.
• Chapter 7: Sliding Occlusions—An introduction to the occlusion analysis
and a novel attack that uses this analysis.
• Chapter 8: Conclusions—A final discussion, summary of contributions, and
recommendations for future work.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND

Over the past decade, deep learning has transformed computer vision thereby allowing for rapid developments within the field; however, deep learning has a significant
shortcoming in the form of adversarial examples [7]. These carefully crafted images
and objects can produce significant misclassifications in deep learning models similar
to a human’s confident misinterpretation of an optical illusion. This chapter will first
discuss some of the fundamentals of deep learning that are used in this thesis. After
introducing these fundamentals, advanced techniques that are used in this thesis will
be introduced.

2.1

Neural Networks

Neural networks are the fundamental building blocks of deep learning models. These
models consist of connected nodes (neurons) that pass signals through the model.
By varying weights and biases within the model, different stimuli produce different
outputs.
While neural networks seem to have roots in biological neural structures, they can
be represented with simple linear algebra. The input to a node can be expressed by
Equation 2.1 where i indexes a node in the previous layer, w is the weight for the
connection between node i and the current node, x is the output signal from node i,
and b is the bias for the current node. This simple method for representing neural
networks has many interesting properties, among them being fast computation due
to their representations as matrices.
5

Figure 2.1: Simple fully-connected 3-layer neural network [8]

N odeInput =

X

wi xi + b

(2.1)

i

The final layer, typically known as the output layer, is then interpreted as the model’s
prediction.

2.1.1

Activation Functions

Activation functions provide pseudo-thresholding capabilities to nodes. Strong inputs
will cause the node to “fire” (an intuition drawn from biological neurons) while weak
signals result in little to no output signal. A node produces its output by taking the
sum of the inputs, passing it through the activation function, and then outputting
this signal. These activation functions add non-linearity to a model, which in turn
makes it possible for a model to act as universal approximators [9].
The sigmoid activation function, which was a popular activation function during
the early development of neural networks, is shown in Equation 2.2. Sigmoids were
popular due their intuitive nature of a neuron firing; however, they have fallen out of
favor for two reasons. The first of these reasons is that they saturate and kill gradients,
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which makes updating the model via backpropagation much more challenging. The
second of these reasons is that sigmoid outputs are not zero-centered, which produces
undesirable zig-zagging dynamics when updating model weights [8].

σ(x) =

1
1 + e−x

(2.2)

The Rectified Linear Unit, or ReLU, activation function has replaced the sigmoid
activation function as the go-to activation for hidden layers in neural networks. ReLU,
which is calculated using Equation 2.3, is faster during training as it avoids the
vanishing gradient issue produced by the sigmoid activation function. Additionally,
ReLU and its derivative are faster to calculate as its operations are less expensive
than those used in the sigmoid activation function [8].

ReLU (x) = max(0, x)

(2.3)

The softmax activation function is used at the output layer of a model to normalize
outputs; this is unlike the sigmoid and ReLU activation functions which are used
in the hidden layers. Presented as Equation 2.4, the softmax function provides an
intuitive sense for class probabilities by scaling the sum of the outputs to 1; however,
it is important to note that these normalized probabilities are not true probabilities
or confidences. For this thesis, the model output, which will be the output of the
softmax function, will be referred to as a probability or confidence. The function
preserves the ordering of the values. There are other functions that can be used in
the final layer of a neural network, including monotonic normalization functions, but
softmax is among the most popular and frequently used in existing neural networks.
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ezj
Sof tmaxj (z) = P z
k
ke

2.1.2

(2.4)

Loss Functions

During training, it is imperative to assess a model’s accuracy, which is then used to
increase the model’s accuracy and ability to produce correct output. To achieve this,
loss functions are used to provide a non-binary, quantitative assessment of the model’s
accuracy. Using the calculated loss, a model can be updated via backpropagation to
improve subsequent inferences.
The first of these loss functions is the categorical hinge loss, which is presented in
Equation 2.5. Categorical hinge loss, also known as the max-margin loss, provides
a loss value ranging from 1 to 0. This loss function is typically reserved for support
vector machines (SVMs); however, I found it to produce stronger gradients when
vanishing gradients became an issue with the categorical cross-entropy loss function.

CategoricalHinge(ytrue , ypred ) = max(1 − ytrue × ypred , 0)

(2.5)

The second of these loss functions is the categorical cross-entropy loss function, which
is presented in Equation 2.6. The categorical cross-entropy loss function aims to
minimize the cross-entropy between the true and predicted probability distributions,
which in the case of classification is achieved by placing all predicted mass at the
position of the true class [8]. This loss function is commonly used for multi-class
classification models.
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CategoricalCrossEntropy(ytrue , ypred ) = −

X

ytruei × log(ypredi )

(2.6)

i

2.1.3

Backpropagation

The underlying mathematics that enable neural networks to learn is backpropagation.
After a forward pass of the model, a loss value is calculated using the chosen loss
function. The gradient of this loss function can be expressed as ∇Loss(x), which
informs how to change the loss function’s input for a maximum change in the loss
function’s output.
Of course, the input to the loss function cannot randomly change; namely, the loss
function’s input must change due to changes in the previous layers. These gradients
can repeat with each layer’s derivative being calculated by

∂Layeri
.
∂Layeri−1

To update the

weights in layer i, the gradients from each layer are chained together using the chain
rule. This allows one to determine how the weights in layer i should be updated to
minimize the loss calculated at the end of the model. These chained gradients are
expressed as Equation 2.7.

∂Loss
∂Loss ∂Layern
∂Layeri
=
...
∂weightsi
∂Layern ∂Layern−1
∂weightsi

(2.7)

By finding the gradient of the loss with respect to the weights in each layer, each layer
can be updated to minimize the loss for the given training example. By repeating
this process with many training examples, the model’s performance is improved.
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Backpropagation is a standard part of deep learning libraries, meaning that while
understanding these mechanics is important, it is not usually necessary to implement
them in order to train a model.

2.1.4

Regularization

Neural networks have the ability to approximate any function [9]; however, when
presented with a limited data set, models can accidentally learn the data set rather
than the true distribution the model is supposed to approximate. This issue, known as
overfitting, is a common and serious issue when training models. Many regularization
methods exist for handling overfitting such as L1 regularization, L2 regularization,
and dropout.
L1 and L2 regularization depend on the L1 and L2 distances, which are given by
equations 2.8 and 2.9, where V1 and V2 are individual vectors. While these functions
can be used for measuring distances between two arbitrary vectors, they are more
commonly used for measuring the growth of weights in a model or for quantifying the
difference between two images.

L1 (V1 , V2 ) =

X

V1 [i] − V2 [i]

(2.8)

i

L2 (V1 , V2 ) =

s
X

V1 [i] − V2 [i]

2

(2.9)

i

For regularization, these functions are used to penalize weights. This is done by
finding a L1 or L2 distance between a model’s weights and a zero vector of the same
size and then adding this value, multiplied by some tunable parameter, to the model’s
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loss function. The training of the model will then try to minimize the loss function,
which will pressure the model to keep weights small and thereby avoid overfitting the
data while simultaneously improving its overall accuracy.
L1 and L2 differ in how they penalize differences. L2 penalizes individual differences
much more significantly than the L1 distance, which leads to the L1 distance favoring
sparseness while L2 favors uniformity.
Dropout, a more advanced regularization technique that was first presented by Hinton
et al. [10][11], is another technique used to avoid overfitting. To prevent nodes
from co-adapting to the data set too much, dropout randomly removes nodes and
their connections temporarily during training as seen in Figure 2.2. An intuitive
explanation for why this works is that applying dropout during training produces a
model that is an average of many other models where strong connections are consistent
across models while weak or noisy connections are are lost in the dropout process.

Figure 2.2: A standard neural network (left) and a neural network after
applying dropout (right) [11]
Srivastava et al. found that dropout provides substantial benefits over other regularization methods, and that a dropout rate of 0.5 is optimal for many models and tasks.
It should also be noted that dropout only occurs during training; during inference all
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nodes are active, which means validation and testing accuracy often exceed training
accuracy.

2.2

Deep Learning

Deep learning is characterized by the depth, or number of layers, of a model. By
developing models that are composed of multiple processing layers (often containing
10-20 layers [8]), deep learning allows models to learn representations of data with
multiple layers of abstraction [12]. The ability to extract and classify learned features
is what provides deep learning models with this ability to perform well in the field
of computer vision as images typically consist of abstractions that can be learned by
these multi-layer models, which is demonstrated by the ability of deep learning models
to dramatically surpass the capabilities of traditional computer vision algorithms [13].
Furthermore, while deep learning models are very time consuming to train, they are
often very fast at test time, which is typically desirable in practice [8].

2.3

Convolutional Neural Networks

While neural networks have demonstrated significant success and are believed to universal approximators, they can become overwhelmingly large when used for images.
Images, which can contain anywhere from thousands to millions of pixels, are very
large input vectors. When scaling a neural network to process these inputs, the
number of trainable parameters becomes overwhelmingly large.
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) make the explicit assumption that the input
layer is an image. By doing so, the number of parameters for the model can be greatly
reduced, which in turn allows for deeper models. As seen in Figure 2.3, CNNs use 3D
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Figure 2.3: Basic CNN architecture showing a image input layer, filter,
and a convolutional layer [8]

Figure 2.4: AlexNet architecture divided for training across two GPUs
[14]
volumes of neurons that convolve across layers. The ability to find patterns within
an image grows with the model’s depth, which means models with more layers can
find increasingly complex patterns.
Convolutional neural networks conclude with one or more dense, or fully-connected,
layers. These layers coalesce the the patterns found in the image into the probabilities
that the model outputs. AlexNet [14], the first highly successful CNN, is shown in
Figure 2.4.
Convolutional neural networks have a number of additional layers and parameters
that can be used to improve a model’s performance, but they are outside the purview
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of this thesis. The documentation for a deep learning library will contain a list of
available layers, at which point a researcher can determine which layers may be useful
for their application.

2.4

Feature Extraction and Feature Classification

Early computer vision required domain-specific knowledge when developing image
classification algorithms. Designers typically developed feature extraction algorithms
such as histogram of oriented gradients (HOG). These feature extractors were manually developed and selected for certain image domains, which proved to be quite
challenging. Once an image was reduced via feature extraction, this feature vector
was classified using a simple classifier such as a support vector machine (SVM). By
coupling these algorithms, image classification algorithms could be created.
Convolutional neural networks have changed image classification. Rather than a
two-stage approach, which required significant algorithm development using domainspecific knowledge, developers can use end-to-end machine learning for image classification.
A convolutional neural network used for image classification can be thought of as two
stages: feature extraction and feature classification. The first of these stages, feature
extraction, consists of the convolutional layers comprised primarily of convolving
filters. The second of these stages, feature classification, consists of fully-connected
layers that classify the extracted features into class probabilities.
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2.5

Transfer Learning

As previously discussed, one of the major challenges when developing deep learning
models is the need for substantial computing power and access to large data sets.
This differs from humans who can learn tasks (e.g. image classification) in very little
time with very little data. Humans can achieve this by utilizing existing knowledge
of a domain (e.g. what features are common and distinguishing among animals) to
quickly learn new classifications.
This inspires transfer learning, a technique that allows deep learning models to learn
faster with less data [15][16]. When implementing transfer learning, a developer
retrains an existing, pre-trained model on a different data set. Retraining, which
involves training weights that are initialized to weights trained on a different data
set, can be applied to some or all of the model’s weights. Layers that are not updated
are considered “frozen” or “untrainable” while layers that are updated are considered
“unfrozen” or “trainable.”
There are four scenarios guiding how many layers should be frozen during the training
process [8]. These decisions are made based on the similarity between the old and
new data sets as well as the size of the new data set.

• Small and similar Due to the limited data, overfitting is a concern. Since
the data set is similar to the original, the previously learned features will likely
work well for the new data set. Thus, retrain the classification layers.
• Small and different Due to the limited data, overfitting is a concern. Since
the data set is different, the classifier and some feature extraction layers should
be tuned to better match the new task.
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• Large and similar With a large data set available, overfitting is less likely to
occur. All layers can be adjusted to better fit the new task.
• Large and different With a large data set, overfitting is less likely to occur. Additionally, it will be desirable to retrain all layers, including the feature
extraction layers, to adjust to the new task.

2.6

Residual Networks

Researchers have empirically determined that increasing the depth of a model improves the model as shallow models are subsets of deeper models. Unfortunately,
due to the difficulty of training extremely deep models, deeper models can have poor
performance unless they are designed and trained correctly.
It is confusing that a deeper model would not perform as well as its shallower counterpart. After all, a deep model consisting of a shallow model followed by a series
of identity functions (until the depth of the deeper model is obtained) should have
the same performance as the shallower model. This unexpected result is due to the
vanishing gradient problem [17], which is when the backpropagated gradients become
so small that they cannot be used to update the model’s weights. When the gradients
are unable to be backpropagated appropriately, the model’s performance suffers.
Residual networks (ResNets) presented by He et. al [18] aim to solve this issue by
allowing signals to take shortcuts through the model as demonstrated in Figure 2.5.
These shortcuts enable the signals to pass forward through the identity function, and
then for gradients to backpropagate through without vanishing.
Figure 2.6 shows ResNet-34, a 34-layer residual network. Larger ResNets with depths
of 50, 101, and 152 are expanded by increasing the block sizes (i.e. changing the
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Figure 2.5: Fundamental building block of residual networks [18]
number of layers in Figure 2.5). This allows for a dramatic increase in the number
of layers in a ResNet while ensuring there is still a somewhat direct path back to the
model’s input via shortcut connections.
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Figure 2.6: A 34-layer residual network (the left portion feeds into the
right portion) designed for use with 1000 classes [18]
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Chapter 3
RELATED WORKS

This chapter introduces related papers and developments that are related to the
discovery of adversarial examples, the development of physically robust adversarial
examples, and proposed defenses and their efficacy against these attacks. Namely,
this chapter is three sections: early adversarial examples, physically robust adversarial
examples, and defenses against adversarial examples.

3.1

Early Adversarial Examples

In 2014, Szegedy et al. found that hardly perceptible perturbations, which can be
found by maximizing the network’s prediction error, can produce misclassifications
by the network [7]. It was then discovered that perturbing just a single pixel can
result in misclassifications [19]. Additionally, researchers found that it is possible to
produce artificial images that are completely unrecognizable to humans while being
classified with extremely high confidence by deep neural networks [20]. The Fast
Gradient Sign Method, presented by Goodfellow et al., produces adversarial examples
by adding imperceptible perturbations to images [4]. Furthermore, they argue that
these gradient-based techniques are highly effective due to the linearity of neural
networks, despite the early explanations that argued adversarial examples were the
product of highly non-linear, overfitted models.
Significantly, Szegedy et al. found that adversarial examples generated on one network
can produce misclassifications on a different network [7]. It was also found that these
perturbations are more robust to transferability if generated by a single-step attack
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rather than a multi-step attack [21]. These discoveries were fundamental to the
development of black-box attacks, in which an attacker approximates a model and
then attacks the substitute model [22].

3.2

Physically Robust Adversarial Examples

Early adversarial examples assumed attackers had the ability to feed data directly into
a machine learning model. While this was effective for demonstrating the existence
of adversarial examples, the threat of these attacks was limited by the fact attackers
typically do not have direct access to a model. Kurakin et al. were able to demonstrate
that simple adversarial examples were able to survive the physical transformations
that result from photographing a printed adversarial example [23]. This work was
expanded on by Athalye et al., who successfully manufactured the first 3D adversarial
object [24]. Additionally, Eykholt et al. developed physically robust traffic signs that
were carefully crafted such that the perturbations mimic graffiti, which enables the
attack to “hide in the human psyche” [5].

3.3

Defenses to Adversarial Examples

To mitigate the damage caused by these attacks, researchers have explored potential techniques to avoid misclassifying adversarial examples. One such approach is
defensive distillation [25], which relies on neural network distillation [26]; however,
defensive distillation has since been found to be ineffective against adversarial examples [27]. Another technique, which uses an ensemble of weak defenses in an attempt
to develop a strong defense [28], is believed to be an insufficient defense against adversarial examples [29]. Another potential defense mechanism is training on adversarial
examples; however, it was observed that such models will ultimately perform better
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on adversarial examples than on clean examples [21]. Finally, some researchers believe
that due to the fact deep neural networks are theoretically universal approximators
[9], efforts should be focused on improving the training of neural networks, not on
developing defense mechanisms [30].
At this time, there are no effective defenses against adversarial examples.
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Chapter 4
TOOLS

Deep learning is a computationally-intensive field that requires significant hardware,
software, and data to achieve good results. This chapter will detail these tools—
hardware, software, and data—that were used in the development and analysis of
this thesis.

4.1

Computing Platform

Deep learning requires significant hardware resources to develop and utilize models.
All the deep learning work for this thesis was conducting in Cal Poly’s Massively Parallel Accelerated Computing (MPAC) Lab. The MPAC lab offers nearly 40 machines
that feature 28-core Intel Xeon CPUs running at 2.30 GHz. Each of these machines
also contains an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 980 GPU with 3593 MB of memory. Finally,
each machine offers 2 TB of local disk space that can be used for storing models and
data sets.

4.2

Software

Python is the dominant programming language in the machine learning community
due to its high-level nature and wealth of libraries available, which makes prototyping
and developing models and pipelines very easy. This thesis used Python 3 in order
to utilize the latest releases of libraries.
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4.2.1

Deep Learning

The deep learning frameworks used are TensorFlow [31] and Keras [32]. TensorFlow
is an open-source machine learning library developed by Google that uses dataflow
graphs to represent computation [33]. TensorFlow can be easily installed to run with
both CPU and GPU, which makes learning much faster. Keras, a modular neural
network library that can run on top of TensorFlow, offers users a high-level API to the
TensorFlow library [34]. This makes it easy to build, modify, train, and test models
in Python.
Together, these libraries offer an easy way to implement deep learning techniques.
These libraries allow developers to spend less time implementing the minutiae of
deep learning and more time on making cutting-edge developments.

4.2.2

Image Manipulation

Image manipulation was achieved using OpenCV [35], an open-source computer vision library written in C and C++ with APIs for Python and C++ [36]. OpenCV
offers many functions for image processing and manipulation. OpenCV was used to
produce pseudo-natural transformations to images. These pseudo-natural transformations could then be used to assess the robustness of attacks in the physical world.

4.2.3

Analysis

Data analysis and figure generation was achieved using Matplotlib, pandas, and
seaborn. These Python libraries make it easy to extract meaningful conclusions from
data and produce complex figures.
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4.2.4

Data & Models

The models used in this thesis were trained on the ImageNet [37] and and German
Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark [38] data sets. These data sets are open source
and commonly used in research, which make them good benchmarks for this work.
Note that the models trained on the ImageNet data set were borrowed pre-trained
and borrowed from the Keras model zoo.

4.3

Summary

Table 4.1 provides a summary of the tools used in this thesis.
Table 4.1: Summary of tools used in this thesis
Type
Resource
Hardware
Cal Poly MPAC Lab
Python 3, TensorFlow, Keras,
Software
OpenCV, Matplotlib, pandas, seaborn
Data
ImageNet, GTSRB
Keras model zoo (ResNet-50,
Models
VGG16, MobileNet)
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Chapter 5
FAST GRADIENT SIGN METHOD

This chapter will outline the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) developed by Goodfellow et al. [4]. FGSM has become immensely popular for developing adversarial
examples, and has been used to create perturbations in other attacks. Understanding and implementing the FGSM technique is essential to success in exploring and
developing additional attacks.

5.1

Background

An early and significant contribution to the field of adversarial examples for computer vision models was the introduction of the Fast Gradient Sign Method. In the
corresponding paper, Goodfellow et al. contradicted existing literature by arguing
that machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples due to their
linear nature. By adopting the viewpoint that a target model is linear in nature, one
can quickly generate adversarial examples. More specifically, this linear assumption
allows one to exploit Equation 5.1, where w is some weight vector, x is the input
image, and η is the target perturbation.

wT x̃ = wT x + wT η

(5.1)

Due to the large number of input values that make up an image, many small adjustments to a perturbation can accumulate thereby allowing for large changes in
a model’s output activation. Thus, a collection of seemingly insignificant changes
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in the input pixels can produce a significant change in the model’s output, thereby
producing a misclassification.
The question then becomes how one should generate perturbation η. Unlike updating
a model’s weights, which is expressed by Equation 5.2 where θ is the model’s parameters, x is the input image, y is the target model output, J(θ, x, y) is the loss function
used to train the model, and  is a scaling value, Goodfellow et al. proposed FGSM,
which is expressed by Equation 5.3. The difference between these equations is that
Equation 5.2 updates a model’s parameters while Equation 5.3 updates the input to
the model.

∇θ J(θ, x, y)

(5.2)


η = sign ∇x J(θ, x, y)

(5.3)

Goodfellow et al. found that FGSM reliably causes a wide variety of models to
misclassify inputs. One of the most well-known FGSM examples is shown in Figure
5.1, in which an image of a panda is misclassifed as a gibbon (a type of ape) with
higher confidence even than the original panda.
Interestingly, the Fast Gradient Sign Method is more effective than a Fast Gradient
Method (remove the sign(·) function from Equation 5.3). This is likely the result
of forcing small gradients, which are typically far more numerous than large gradients, to make larger contributions to input image, and thereby the network’s overall
activation.
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Figure 5.1: Goodfellow et al.’s seminal FGSM example [4]

Figure 5.2: Top-1 and top-5 accuracy of Inception v3 on images produced
by various attack methods over a varying  [23]
Kurakin et al. also introduced two similar methods similar to FGSM for generating
adversarial examples: Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method and Iterative Least-Likely
Class Method [23]. The Iterative FGSM attack, which is a multi-step attack, recalculates the perturbation η is recalculated. The Iterative Least-Likely Class Method,
is similar to the Iterative FGSM attack, but it differs by being an untargeted attack
that simply aims to destroy the confidence in the actual class. The effectiveness of
these methods, which is shown in Figure 5.2, is significantly higher than for the basic
FGSM introduced in Equation 5.3.
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As iterative methods are multi-step attacks that produce much finer perturbations
by exploiting subtleties in a model, iterative methods are typically less effective at
higher values of  in addition to being less likely to transfer between models or be
physically robust.

5.2

Verification of Existing Work

Iterative FGSM, presented as Algorithm 1, is easily implemented using deep learning
libraries. Furthermore, due to optimizations within these libraries, a forward pass
through a model and the corresponding backpropagation are very fast, which makes
generating adversarial examples quite fast (anywhere from a few seconds for easy
images to a few minutes for challenging images).
Algorithm 1: Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
Result: adv img
adv img = clean img;
target = one hot(target class, num classes);
for epoch in epochs do
loss = loss function(target, model.output);
grads = gradients(loss, model.input);
signs = -1 * signs(grads);
adv img = clip(adv img + epsilon * signs, lower bound, upper bound);
end
return adv img;
Though not stated by Goodfellow et al. or Kurakin et al., this thesis found that
the ability to convert images into adversarial examples depends significantly on the
model being attacked and the model’s confidence in the target class. If a model is
extremely confident in the correct class, it makes generating adversarial examples
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quite challenging. For instance, perturbing a trolley to a passenger car is quite easy
(the two classes are semantically similar with a set of similar or shared features)
while perturbing a trolley into a cucumber is quite challenging (there is little overlap
in semantic meaning or key features).
Additionally, this thesis observed that though the categorical cross-entropy loss function is most effective for perturbing images into neighboring classes (e.g. trolley to
passenger car), the categorical hinge loss is more effective for perturbing images into
distance classes (e.g. trolley to cucumber). This was due to the gradients from the
categorical cross-entropy loss being flattened during backpropagation and completely
vanishing in the case of challenging images, making it impossible to attack these
challenging examples with the cross-entropy loss function.
Figure 5.3 is a sample output from the implemented pipeline targeting the ResNet-50
model from the Keras model zoo, which is trained on the ImageNet data set. The
clean image (left) is easily classified as a trolley by both a human and the target
model (softmax activations of 0.998 for trolley, 1.05e-08 for cucumber). The carefully
crafted noise (middle)—dramatically scaled for contrast—is meaningless to both a
human and the model (the top classification for the noise is a softmax activation
of 0.362 for a park bench). The adversarial image (right) is easily classified as a
trolley by the human; however, it is confidently misclassified by the target model as
a cucumber (softmax activations of 2.22e-13 for trolley, 1.0 for cucumber).
The probability of the target class over these iterations is shown in Figure 5.4. More
specifically, the figure shows the probabilities of any classes that were the top class
at any point during the attack. This indicates that the image of the trolley is almost
immediately destroyed, at which point the model cannot make any prediction with
significant confidence; however, at the conclusion of the attack, the cucumber class
quickly emerges as the dominant class.
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Figure 5.3: Clean image of a trolley (left) with a softmax activation 0.998,
the corresponding perturbation scaled for visualization (middle), and the
adversarial example (right) with a softmax activation of 1.0
Initial experiments regarding the robustness of these adversarial images across models
and the physical domain were conducted using the trolley images in Figure 5.5. The
methodology of these experiments is as follows. First, images were generated by
applying both the Non-Iterative FGSM and Iterative FGSM until the images were
classified by the ResNet-50 model as adversarial examples. Second, the images were
passed to the ResNet-50, VGG16, and MobileNet models from the Keras model zoo.
Finally, the images were displayed on a smart phone, photographed by another smart
phone, and cropped before being classified again. This photographic transformation
provides changes in contrast, brightness, blur, noise, and data (lossy JPEG encoding).
The results of these initial experiments, which are shown in Table 5.1 (robustness
across models) and Table 5.2 (robustness across models and the physical domain)
disagreed with those found by Kurakin et al. [23]; however, additional experiments
were able to find some agreement with Kurakin et al.’s results. This discrepancy
appears to be due to the confidence in the initial classification.
Rather than using the trolley image, which is confidently classified by the classifier,
the attack utilizes a less confident image, the washing machine from Kurakin et al.
[23], which is shown in Figure 5.6. It was observed that using an image with a lower
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Figure 5.4: Class probabilities during the Iterative FGSM attack

Table 5.1: Robustness of trolley adversarial images generated on ResNet50 across multiple models
Clean Image
Non-Iterative FGSM
Iterative FGSM
Passenger
Passenger
Passenger
Model
Trolley
Trolley
Trolley
Car
Car
Car
ResNet-50 0.979
0.019
5.75e-4
0.966
3.14e-08
1.0
VGG16
0.994
0.004
0.976
0.0157
0.983
0.012
MobileNet 0.995
0.004
0.996
0.004
0.995
0.004

Table 5.2: Robustness of trolley adversarial images generated on ResNet50 across multiple models after being transformed through the physical
domain
Clean
Non-Iterative
Iterative
Passenger
Passenger
Passenger
Model
Trolley
Trolley
Trolley
Car
Car
Car
ResNet-50 0.942
0.056
0.456
0.548
0.395
0.590
VGG16
0.997
0.002
0.997
0.003
0.997
0.003
MobileNet 0.979
0.020
0.991
0.008
0.993
0.006
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Figure 5.5: Clean image of a trolley (left), a Non-Iterative FGSM adversarial image targeting the passenger car class (middle), and an Iterative
FGSM adversarial image targeting the passenger car class (right)
clean confidence increases the likelihood of adversarial examples successfully transferring across models (Table 5.3) in addition to surviving transformations through the
physical domain (Table 5.4).

Figure 5.6: Clean image of a washer (left), a Non-Iterative FGSM adversarial image targeting the safe class (middle), and an Iterative FGSM
adversarial image targeting the safe class (right)
While the target class is not always the maximum class, and occasionally the actual
class remains the dominant class, these attacks typically prove to be sufficiently effective to reduce the actual class dramatically (to the point where it is indistinguishable
from other classes), even across models and through physical transformations.
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Table 5.3: Robustness of washer adversarial images generated on ResNet50 across multiple models
Clean
Non-Iterative
Iterative
Model
Washer
Safe
Washer Safe Washer
Safe
ResNet-50
0.689
0.009
0.001 0.190 2.38e-08
1.0
VGG16
0.504
0.336
0.004 0.927
0.051
0.897
MobileNet 0.987 1.98e-04 0.176 0.136
0.878
0.0579
Table 5.4: Robustness of washer adversarial images generated on ResNet50 across multiple models after being transformed through the physical
domain
Clean
Non-Iterative
Iterative
Model
Washer Safe Washer Safe Washer Safe
ResNet-50
0.692 0.013 0.021 0.065 0.060 0.834
VGG16
0.275 0.246 0.010 0.250 0.050 0.524
MobileNet 0.803 0.022 0.019 0.148 0.508 0.267

5.3

Extension of Existing Work

While Goodfellow et al. [4] and Kurakin et al. [23] provide substantial developments
regarding FGSM, they provide little data to support any argument regarding the
linearity or robustness of the attack. The goal of this section is to provide that data.

5.3.1

Linearity of Iterative FSGM

Goodfellow et al. claim that it is the linear nature of neural networks that results
in the vulnerability to adversarial examples. To assess the linearity of the Iterative
FGSM attack, the correlation of sign maps over the course of the attack was plotted,
which is shown in Figure 5.9.
Sign maps are defined to be the sign of the gradients in Equation 5.3. Then, the total
number of matching signs is divided by the total number of pixels in the sign map,
which produces the correlation.
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Figure 5.7: Cropped photographs of the images in Figure 5.5

Figure 5.8: Cropped photographs of the images in Figure 5.6
A sign map correlation matrix is presented in Figure 5.9, which shows little correlation
between sign maps. A value of 0.5 suggests no correlation, which is the dominant value
throughout the correlation matrix; however, in the last few iterations, the correlation
values increase slightly. These last iterations are shown in Figure 5.10 in an effort to
improve readability.
It is interesting to note that the beginning and end of the attack have higher correlation values. Considering the probabilities over the course of the attack (see Figure
5.4 for the class probabilities during this attack), it seems clear that the correlations
of the sign maps go through three stages. First, the sign maps are highly correlated
as the confidence in the actual class quickly diminishes. Next, the sign maps have
little correlation as the probabilities and perturbations wander aimlessly in search for
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Figure 5.9: Correlation matrix of sign maps during all iterations of an
Iterative FGSM

Figure 5.10: Correlation matrix of sign maps during the final 10 stages of
an Iterative FGSM
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the target class. The final stage is when the sign maps become highly correlated once
more and the confidence in the target class rapidly increases.
Additional studies to find localized correlations between sign maps yielded noise.
Overall, it seems that while there are pockets of linearity, the majority of the domain
is non-linear, making it challenging to effectively navigate the space while relying on
the linearity of neural networks. This provides context for Goodfellow et al.’s claim.

5.3.2

Robustness of FGSM

Another question regarding the adversarial examples generated by the FGSM attacks
is their robustness. Though much of this has been addressed in Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2, this section will provide new and more targeted studies of robustness.
The first of these studies is the effect of random noise on an adversarial example.
This is motivated by the observation that perturbations appear (to a human) to
be random noise. With this in mind, this study iteratively generates and applies
randomly generated sign maps to an image while observing the class probabilities.
Though it is observed that these randomly generated sign maps can reduce an adversarial example’s target probability and eventually remove the adversarial image from
the target class, the probability of the actual class is never recovered. For instance,
Figure 5.11 shows an adversarial examples before and after the application of approximately 20 iterations of random noise. When the target probability (cucumber)
is lost due to the noise, the original probability (trolley) is minimal and the model
cannot reliably suggest the image on the right is a trolley.
As a control, this same procedure is applied to the clean image of the trolley. The
clean image proves to be significantly more robust to noise and only deteriorates out
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Figure 5.11: Adversarial example (left) that is misclassified as a cucumber
(0.9999) and the image after the liberal addition of noise (right) misclassified as a flowerpot (0.0714)
of the original class (trolley) after more than 50 iterations of randomly generated sign
maps; however, due to the increased number of iterations, the image is significantly
damaged, which can be seen in Figure 5.12. Overall, this suggests that adversarial
examples are quite fragile compared to their clean counterparts as the adversarial
images are merely false representations of objects.

Figure 5.12: Clean example (left) and the image after the liberal addition
of noise (right) misclassified as a park bench (0.2988)
Another interesting question regarding the robustness of FGSM attacks is what happens if FGSM is applied to an adversarial example in an attempt to take the image
back to its original class. Even after an adversarial example has been crafted such
that the softmax activation for the target class is 1.0 (perhaps taking dozens of iterations), the confidence in the adversarial class quickly diminished back to the true class
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during an FGSM attack attempting to take the adversarial example back to its true
class. While this is not a potential defense technique, it is an interesting observation
as it suggests FGSM targets subtleties in the model that are destroyed by reversing
FGSM rather than obfuscating and destroying the key features used in classification.
The final study regarding the robustness of images generated by the FGSM attack is
the effect of simple transformations on an adversarial example. The effects of these
transformations—rotation, brightness, Gaussian noise, Gaussian blur, and contrast—
are as follows.

• Rotation: The Non-Iterative FGSM images were typically able to survive small
angle rotational transformations. Rotation was the only transformation that
could recover the original class.
• Brightness: The target class was lost in all adversarial images; however, the
actual class was not recovered and the model was unable to make a confident
decision regarding any class.
• Noise: The target class was lost in all adversarial images; however, the actual
class was not recovered and the model was unable to make a confident decision
regarding any class.
• Blur: The target class was lost in all adversarial images; however, the actual
class was not recovered and the model was unable to make a confident decision
regarding any class.
• Contrast: The target class was lost in some but not all adversarial images.
Additionally, the actual class was recovered in some cases.

These transforms not only provide some insight to the robustness of adversarial examples in the physical world, but they suggest that the FGSM attacks target weaknesses
38

in the model’s training set or parameters rather than fundamental attacks to the semantic meaning of the image. This is supported by the fact that rotations of only a
few degrees have the ability to reduce images back to their original class.
Additionally, these studies suggest that popular preprocessing techniques used in
classical computer vision such as contrast optimization and blurring may provide
little value in defending against adversarial examples.
Finally, note that the reason for the lack of quantitative data for these transformations is due to the overwhelming number of variables across these transformations.
Between different transformation types, numerous variables (angles, kernels, distributions, and scaling values), and testing across numerous images, it is challenging to
find a meaningful way of testing and presenting these transformations. Rather, select
parameters were chosen to get a sense of the effects of the transformations, which
were then summarized in a bulleted form.

5.3.3

Perturbations

Two interesting questions arise regarding the perturbations themselves used in generating adversarial examples, which relate to the greater question of whether perturbations modify the semantic meaning of an image or whether they attack subtleties
in a network.
The first of these questions is whether perturbations developed on one image can be
used to damage other images. This experiment was conducted by perturbing an image
towards a target class while modifying a second image with the same perturbations.
Not only were the perturbations ineffective at helping the second image reach the
target class, they proved to do little to the true class of the second image. These
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results seem to support the idea that perturbations are unique to the image and not
the underlying object or model.
The second question is whether interesting properties can be discovered by classifying
perturbations. Unfortunately, classifying perturbations and sign maps provides little
meaningful information. Not only are these inputs not classified as the original or
target classes, but the classifications are typically the same classifications given to
randomly generated perturbations, which agrees with Goodfellow et al. [4]. Namely,
it seems that to a model, stand-alone perturbations are meaningless to a model until
they are added to the image for which they were generated.
Considering the observations that FGSM perturbations are ineffective on other images
and have no interesting classification themselves, it seems perturbations produced by
FGSM do not change the semantic meaning of images. This is particularly intriguing as these attacks still have the potential to carry across models, which suggests
that FGSM attacks are still capable of finding underlying visual clues that are being
leverage by multiple models. Consequently, this is promising for generating physically
robust attacks.

5.4

Conclusions

The family of Fast Gradient Sign Method attacks provide intriguing insights to neural
networks. Developing successful attacks requires deep understanding of the target by
the adversary, and the FGSM attacks provide unique insight to the linearity of models
and their decision space.
More importantly, the FGSM attacks are a critical baseline for generating more sophisticated adversarial examples. FGSM provides a reliable way of perturbing images,
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and advanced techniques discussed in later sections provide ways of controlling perturbations during the course of an attack.
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Chapter 6
PHYSICALLY ROBUST PERTURBATIONS

A natural question after the development of the Fast Gradient Sign Method is how
can perturbations be designed to be physically robust? As attackers rarely have
direct access to a model’s input (and if they do, there are more effective attacks than
feeding in adversarial inputs), adversaries have few options for attacking a model.
In the case of computer vision models, this is typically in the form of providing
adversarial inputs to a camera, which is then passed to the target model; however, this
presents the challenge of developing adversarial inputs that can survive the physical
transformations associated with manufacturing and photographing. In an effort to
overcome this challenge, Eykholt et al. [5] proposed Robust Physical Perturbations
(RP2 ).

6.1

Background

Seeking to create adversarial examples that can survive changing conditions and remain effective at fooling a classifier, the RP2 pipeline developed by Eykholt et al.
considers environmental conditions, spatial constraints, physical limits on imperceptibility, and the effects of fabrication error on the adversarial image. An overview of
the RP2 pipeline is given in Figure 6.1.
The attack begins by sampling numerous views of the same object from a distribution,
which allows the attack to generalize to the physical object rather than attacking a
single view. Next, backpropagated gradients are regularized using L1 regularization
to locate the most vulnerable regions of a sign. These regions are identified and
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Figure 6.1: RP2 pipeline overview [5]
used to create masks to limit and control the portions of a sign that are perturbed.
Next, perturbations are applied and constrained using either the L2 or L∞ norms in
addition to other factors such as the Non-Printability Score (NPS) [39]. Finally, the
adversarial sign is manufactured and evaluated.
A simple equation for generating perturbations is formalized as Equation 6.1, where
λ is a hyperparameter to control the regularization of the perturbation, δ is the
perturbation, p denotes the distance function to be used for the norm of δ, J(·, ·) is
the loss function, fθ (·) is the target model, x is the input image, and y ∗ is the target
label.

argminλ||δ||p + J(fθ (x + δ), y ∗ )

(6.1)

δ

Equation 6.1 is then extended to generate robust, spatially-constrained perturbations.
This is formalized by Equation 6.2, where Mx is the perturbation mask to control the
locations of the perturbation, N P S is the Non-Printability score, E is the expected
value of xi that one might expect to find in the distribution of physical and digital
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transformations X V , xi is an image in the distribution, and T (·) is the alignment function that transforms the perturbation in the same way the object in xi is transformed
(e.g. if the object in xi is rotated, the perturbation is rotated as well).

argminλ||Mx · δ||p + N P S + Exi ∼X V J fθ (xi + Ti (Mx · δ)), y ∗



(6.2)

δ

By controlling the locations of the perturbations and regularlizing them, Eykholt et
al. aim to create perturbations that “hide in the human psyche.” An example of this
is shown in Figure 6.2, which shows genuine graffiti (left) and an adversarial example
(right), crafted by Eykholt et al., that aims to mimic genuine graffiti. By doing this,
the attack is less likely to be detected and removed by humans.

Figure 6.2: Genuine graffiti (left) and an adversarial example (right) created by Eykholt et al. [5]

6.2

Verification of Existing Work

The first step of the RP2 is to locate the weak portions of the image. This is done by
using the L1 regularization to locate the most vulnerable portions of the image, as
demonstrated in Figure 6.3. By locating these weak points in the image, masks can
be created to target these regions, which maximizes the effect of the perturbations
while minimizing the amount of the image that needs to be perturbed.
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Figure 6.3: Original image (top left), top 1% of gradients (top right), top
8% of gradients (bottom left), and top 32% of gradients (bottom right),
which can be used to locate the weakest points of an image
Using Figure 6.3, a mask can be manually created to target the most vulnerable
portions of the image. This mask is seen in Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.4: Manually generated mask guided by the L1 regularizations in
Figure 6.3
This mask was then used to attack the original image shown in Figure 6.3. The
algorithmically generated adversarial example is the left image in Figure 6.5. This
image was then used to inspire the manual creation of a generalized, manufacturable
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image, which is shown in right image in Figure 6.5. The softmax activations for 90
kph (not the true class) are remarkably high: 0.947 for the algorithmically generated
image and 0.686 for the manually created image.

Figure 6.5: Algorithmically generated adversarial example (left) constrained by the mask in Figure 6.4 and a manually created adversarial
example (right) inspired by the algorithmically generated adversarial example
Unfortunately, despite repeating this process for several images and generalizing the
results, the adversarial examples proved not to be robust. When rotated slightly, the
images quickly deteriorated back into the stop sign class.
Note that in some cases, the adversarial images generated using the RP2 pipeline
transferred well across models causing misclassifications with extremely high softmax
activations; however, this was rare and suggests the attack is targeting specific models
rather than generalized weaknesses in the object.

6.3

Limitations of Existing Work

This section will address the numerous shortcomings of Eykholt et al.’s RP2 pipeline.
These shortcomings not only make the pipeline challenging to implement and execute,
but they also reduce the effectiveness of the attack across models and in the physical
domain.
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The first issue facing the RP2 pipeline is its reliance on backpropagating gradients.
Though this seems like it is not an issue (after all, models are trained using backpropagation), attacking strong models can be challenging or even impossible due to
vanishing gradients. If a strong model predicts a stop sign with a softmax activation
of 1.0, then the backpropagated gradients will be 0. This makes it impossible to
generated L1 masks or the subsequent perturbations necessary to execute the attack.
Even in cases where the softmax activation is not 1.0, it is possible to have vanishing
gradients that arrive at the input layer (the image) as 0.
The second limitation of the RP2 approach is related to pixelation and the NonPrintability Score (NPS). Even though NPS can be used to better manufacture adversarial examples to represent their digital counterparts, the NPS does not regulate
or reduce the pixelation observed in the adversarial examples. This pixelation exploits
subtleties in the model, rather than finding robust, homogeneous perturbations that
can survive physical transformations. While this makes for fast and effective digital
attacks (e.g. Fast Gradient Sign Method), these results quickly fail when faced with
physical transformations.
Another of RP2 ’s limitations pertains to the constraints placed on the attack pipeline.
While these constraints are impressively well-designed to overcome many of the challenges faced when generating physically robust adversarial images, they are overly
restrictive and make executing an attack challenging or impossible. Finding a way to
relax these constraints would be highly beneficial to attackers as this would increase
the flexibility of the attack.
The final limitation of the RP2 attack pipeline is the number of stages. As discussed
in Section 3.1, multi-step attacks are more likely to seek the subtleties of a model
while single-step attacks are more likely to find general weaknesses that will then
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carry over between models and into the physical domain. Eykholt et al.’s work uses
a myriad of steps, which strongly suggests the attack is inherently weak.

6.4

Conclusions

Eykholt et al.’s RP2 pipeline offers valuable contributions to the field of physically
robust adversarial generation. In an attempt to overcome the demands of developing physically robust attacks, Eykholt et al. draw from a distribution of images,
which is used to develop more general attacks. Furthermore, they propose the use of
masks to control and localize the attack to the weakest regions of the object, which
can be identified by using the L1 regularization. Despite these contributions, the
attack is inherently limited due to its multi-step approach, which in turn reduces its
real-world effectiveness due to the inability to attack strong models, its challenging
implementation, and its overly aggressive constraints.
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Chapter 7
SLIDING OCCLUSIONS

Although computers have achieved performance to rival that of humans on image
classification tasks, deep learning researchers lack understanding as to how machine
learning models produce their output. More specifically, researchers are confused by
which features cause strong signals in a model to produce classifications. One method
of studying the spatially localized features used by a model is to use occlusion analysis,
a technique similar to eye tracking [40] on humans. This chapter will introduce sliding
occlusions, which were first proposed by Zeiler et al. [6]. Then a novel attack will be
presented, whose attack pipeline depends on these sliding occlusions.

7.1

Background

Zeiler et al. first introduced sliding occlusions as a technique to analyze the sensitivity
of classifiers. By occluding portions of an image, one can observe which portions of
an image are important to the correct classification (e.g. the object itself) and which
portions are expendable (e.g. the background). Furthermore, this analysis not only
reveals the features important for classification, but it can help provide confirmation
that a model is identifying the desired objects rather than surrounding contextual
clues commonly associated with an object (e.g. green grass behind a soccer ball).
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7.2

Verification of Existing Work

Though images can be studied by occluding a targeted portion of the image, a systematic approach provides a comprehensive study of an entire image. This approach,
outlined by Algorithm 2, provides researchers with the ability to see the features and
characteristics critical to classification by a model.
Algorithm 2: Sliding Occlusion Heat Maps and Composite Images
Result: heat map, composite img
prob sum = zeros(img.shape)
count = zeros(img.shape)
for row = 0 to height step stride do
for col = 0 to width step stride do
occluded img = copy(img)
occluded img[row:row+size, col:col+size] = 0
prediction = predict(occluded img)[true label]
prob sum[row:row+size, col:col+size] += prediction
count[row:row+size, col:col+size] += 1
end
end
heat map = normalize(prob sum / count)
composite img = heat map * img
return heat map, composite img
The sliding occlusion implementation used in this thesis produced the images in Figure
7.1, which shows the original images (left column), occlusion heat maps (middle
column), and composite images (right column). Not only does Figure 7.1 provide a
sanity check that the model is looking for the primary object in the image, it also
highlights the key parts of the object that led to strong classifications.
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Figure 7.1: Original image (left), occlusion heat map (middle), and a composite image (right) to better visualize the image and heat map simultaneously (red indicates important regions while blue indicates unimportant
regions)
As observed in Figure 7.1, the teapot is most damaged by occluding the spout. The
most damaging of these occlusions, as shown in Figure 7.2, reduced the model’s teapot
softmax activation from 0.706 to 0.011, with the dominant class being a combination
lock (softmax activation of 0.430). Note that the heat maps and composite images
are normalized to increase the contrast between critical and non-critical regions of
the image.
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Note that it is possible to change the size of the occlusion during occlusion analysis.
While larger occlusions can help find larger features during analysis by occluding
large features in their entirety, they also provide lower resolution in the resulting heat
maps and composite images as there are fewer possible positions for the occlusion. In
contrast, small occlusions provide a fine resolution; however, they are limited in their
ability to obscure large features, meaning the heat map and composite image may
not properly represent the original image. The occlusion size is a parameter that can
be adjusted by a researcher. It is best to simply sweep through a few different values
as this provides a comprehensive overview and takes little time, but occlusions with
dimensions roughly 1/8th of the original image are likely close to optimal.

Figure 7.2: Position of most damaging occlusion for the teapot in Figure
7.1

7.3

Extension of Existing Work

Though Zeiler et al. [6] first introduce the idea of occlusions to measure the sensitivity
of a convolutional neural networks to different parts of an input image, they do
nothing beyond using this as a tool as a sanity check that their model is detecting
target objects instead of the surrounding context. This section presents novel uses
of these sliding occlusions, including a novel attack that aims to deliberately occlude
critical components of an image.
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7.3.1

Finding Weaknesses By Detecting Key Features

One significant use of the sliding occlusion analysis is the ability to identify object
features that are key to correct classification. Consider teapots, which were first
introduced in Figure 7.1. One might wonder, what are the characteristics of a teapot
that allow a model to correctly identify it? By running the sliding occlusion analysis
on multiple pictures of teapots, one can begin to see patterns and draw conclusions
regarding strong features. An analysis of teapots, shown in Figure 7.3, indicates that
the spout of a teapot is a key characteristic used in classification. Furthermore, the
analysis seems to suggest that the knob, handle, and void between the two are other
useful features for identifying teapots. It is hypothesized that these features provide
distinction from other related ImageNet classes such as coffee pots, Crock pots, and
frying pans, which do not have overhead handles. This information is valuable as it
provides insight to characteristics that are not typically considered by a human, but
are ultimately valuable to an attacker as they are key to the model’s success.
To further explore this hypothesis, Figure 7.4 is provided. These teapots, which are
missing a handle or a spout, are classified with high softmax activations (0.791 and
0.964). Particularly in the case of the teapot without a spout (top row of Figure 7.4),
this suggests that the model is identifying multiple features, some of which are not
typically considered by a human. It is worth noting though that these teapots are
significantly less robust to occlusions than the previously presented teapots, which is
likely due to their missing key features.
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that sliding occlusions can be used to
locate key features used for classification on an object. By running this analysis on
multiple images of the same class, the key features for the class distribution can be
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Figure 7.3: Original image (left), occlusion heat map (middle), and a composite image (right) to better visualize the image and heat map simultaneously (red indicates important regions while blue indicates unimportant
regions)
identified, which can be useful information for designers or adversaries when training
or attacking models.

7.3.2

Attacking a Model using Sliding Occlusions

One application of occlusion attacks is against traffic sign classifiers that might be
used in autonomous vehicles. To explore this application, three different models were
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Figure 7.4: A teapot without a handle (top row) and a teapot without a
spout (bottom row)
trained on the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) data set using
transfer learning and the initial ImageNet weights from the Keras Model zoo. These
models are a ResNet-50 model, a ResNet-50 model with some adversarial training, and
a MobileNet model. The test accuracies for these models are 98.58%, 99.12%, and
96.86%, respectively. Note that the ResNet-50 models perform significantly better
than the MobileNet model.
Stop signs, which are safety-critical traffic signs, are considered in this untargeted
attack. To find the critical parts of a stop sign, the sliding occlusion analysis, shown
in Figure 7.5, was conducted on three stop signs to better model the stop sign distribution. This analysis revealed two areas that are most important for the correct
classification of stop signs: the area underneath the text “STOP” and the area between and on the letters “T” and “O” This suggests that occluding these regions will
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make correct classification much more challenging for a classifier. The extent of the
damage caused by these occlusions is summarized in Table 7.1.

Figure 7.5: Stop sign sliding occlusion analysis, which identifies the critical
identifying features to be the regions underneath and between the letters
“T” and “O”
Table 7.1: Sliding occlusion analysis of top two classes for the stop signs
in Figure 7.5 (rows in this table correspond to rows in Figure 7.5)
Clean Image
Occluded Image
Top
Second
Top
Second
Class Prob. Class Prob.
Class
Prob. Class Prob.
Stop 0.944 Yield 0.051
Stop
0.361 80 kph 0.290
Stop 0.630 Yield 0.313 Bicycle Xing 0.387
Stop
0.188
Stop 0.706 Yield 0.288
Stop
0.213 80 kph 0.213
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To generate the adversarial stop sign, an unperturbed stop sign is loaded into an
image processing program. The design of this occlusion is as follows. First, a black
occluding region was added underneath the letters “T” and “O” to obscure these
critical regions. Next, a cartoon truck was added between the letters “T” and “O”
to occlude the other critical region as determined by the sliding occlusion analyses of
stop signs. Finally, dashed yellow lines were added to the black occluding region to
give the impression the attack is artwork or graffiti rather than deliberate damage to
a sign. Note that the key regions were determined by the sliding occlusions attack;
the method of obscuring these regions was artistic in order to allow the attack to
“hide in the human psyche” [5].

Figure 7.6: Clean stop sign (left) and adversarial example (right) created
using sliding occlusion analysis of multiple stop signs
To evaluate this attack, the images were displayed on a 24-inch monitor and photographed at an angle from approximately 5 feet away. These images were then
cropped and fed into the classifier as shown in Figure 7.7. The attack proved to be
highly effective against the classifier, with the adversarial image producing a misclassification with a top class of 80 kph. Not only is the model fooled, but the top class is
functionally quite different from a stop sign, meaning vehicle behavior is significantly
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Table 7.2: Performance of adversarial stop signs against a ResNet-50
model
Top
Second
Class
Prob.
Class
Prob.
Clean
Stop
1.0
Rnd.Abt.
1.95e-11
Stop 1 Rnd.Abt. 0.763
Stop
0.233
Stop 2
30 kph
0.917 Left/Straight
0.019
Stop 3
30 kph
0.812 Left/Straight
0.078
Stop 4
60 kph
0.901
80 kph
0.025
different for an 80 kph sign than a yield sign. An intersection with vehicles traveling
passing through at 80 kph instead of stopping would quickly become catastrophic.
The results of this attack are summarized in Table 7.2, Table 7.3, and Table 7.4.

Figure 7.7: Top: Clean, Stop 1, Stop 2; Bottom: Stop 3, Stop 4
Finally, Figure 7.8 shows the images generated by Eykholt et al. [5], Povolny et al.
[41], and this thesis. These images indicate that all researchers are finding the same
universal weaknesses in stop signs, which suggests the sliding occlusion attack would
in fact succeed against the other models used by Eykholt et al. and Povolny et al.
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Table 7.3: Performance of adversarial stop signs against a ResNet-50
model with some adversarial training
Top
Second
Class
Prob.
Class
Prob.
Clean
Stop
0.759
Misc. (42)
0.104
Stop 1
Stop
1.0
Misc. (42)
5.95e-06
Stop 2
50 kph
0.445
Rd. Abt.
0.056
Stop 3
50 kph
0.800
20 kph
0.033
Stop 4 Keep Right
1.0
Left/Straight 2.61e-10
Table 7.4: Performance of adversarial stop signs against a MobileNet
model
Top
Second
Class Prob. Class Prob.
Clean
Stop
0.973 Yield 0.024
Stop 1
Stop
0.798 Yield 0.051
Stop 2
Stop
0.414 Yield 0.118
Stop 3 80 kph 0.443 Stop 0.328
Stop 4 Yield 0.467 Stop 0.345

Figure 7.8: Eykholt et al. [5] (left), Povolny et al. [41] (middle), and
image created in this thesis (right)
Sliding occlusion analysis offers a simple way to generate adversarial examples. While
these are not targeted attacks that seek to maximize a certain class, they succeed in
effectively reducing the confidence in the actual class. In the discussed example
of stop signs, locating and obfuscating critical regions can quickly lead to hazardous
misclassifications. Furthermore, due to the coarseness of this attack (unlike, FGSM or
RP2 ), this attack is quite robust to transformations through the physical domain. This
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is demonstrated by evaluating the designed adversarial stop sign by photographing it
and classifying it, which produces across three different models.
Additionally, this attack can be distinguished from the RP2 presented by Eykholt et
al. by a few key differences:

• The attack is greatly generalized, to ensure its success in the physical domain
and across models
• Adversarial examples are generated in a single step, meaning the attack:
– Targets fundamental weaknesses that exist across models
– Is physically robust
– Is simple to implement and execute
• The generated adversarial images are easy to manufacture for use in the physical
world

7.4

Conclusions

The chapter introduced and verified the sliding occlusion analysis first introduced by
Zeiler et al. More importantly, this chapter introduces a novel attack that utilizes
this sliding occlusion analysis. This attack, which is easy to implement and execute,
is physically robust across models and the physical domain, due in part to its singlestep nature, but also by targeting large features in the target object that are universal
across classifiers.
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS

Autonomous vehicles owe much of their recent success to the advancements made
in computer vision. The deep learning models used to visually perceive the surroundings are incredibly powerful, often meeting or exceeding human performance.
Unfortunately, the existence of adversarial examples poses a significant threat to these
models and their efficacy.
These adversarial examples can effectively fool convolutional neural networks into
confidently making incorrect predictions, similar to how humans confidently misinterpret optical illusions; however, while humans may find optical illusions amusing to
observe, these adversarial examples can result in catastrophic failures in autonomous
vehicles. Therefore, it is important to research and understand these attacks in an
effort to better defend against them.
Early work in this field found adversarial examples that existed solely in the digital
domain; however, further work revealed that these attacks have the ability to transcend models and leap into the physical world. This increases the severity of this
threat, as adversaries now have the ability to remotely attack models despite never
having access to the target system.

8.1

Contributions

This thesis explores adversarial attacks against computer vision models, particularly
as they pertain to autonomous vehicles. Following the discovery by Szegedy et al.
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that hardly perceptible perturbations could produce misclassifications in convolutional neural networks, researchers have explored methods of generating adversarial
examples including methods of making these attacks physically robust. The contributions of this thesis are as follows:

• An in-depth study of the Fast Gradient Sign Method first proposed by Goodfellow et al. [4]. This study explores the linearity of the Iterative Fast Gradient
Sign Method proposed by Kurakin et al. [23], the robustness of the Fast Gradient Sign Method, and properties of the generated perturbations.
• A discussion of the limitations of the Robust Physical Perturbations (RP2 )
attack pipeline developed by Eykholt et al. [5].
• Using occlusion analysis, introduced by Zeiler et al. [6], a novel attack is proposed

8.2

Discussions & Future Work

The contributions of this thesis are significant; however, there are still many interesting questions that must be answered. The first recommendation for future work is a
conclusive verification of Eykholt et al.’s RP2 attack pipeline. Despite its success for
Eykholt et al., it seems unlikely that this attack performs well across models due to
its multi-step approach. Additionally, the attack seems to target models with lower
confidence, which means these models are more easily confused and attacked.
To better understand the work contained in this thesis, researchers should explore
the inner-workings of the model during these attacks. How are the activations different when responding to adversarial examples featuring occlusions compared to clean
images? Is it possible to replace the final softmax layer with a different activation
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function that will reveal when a model is confused and unable to make a confident
decision? Unfortunately, the softmax activation function forces a decision by normalizing the output, which hides the fact the model is confused.
Building on the work presented in this thesis, another opportunity for future work
is the development of a sliding occlusion attack that is targeted. The novel attack
proposed in this paper is untargeted and carries well across models and into the
physical domain; however, it is limited in its ability for an adversary to control the
model’s prediction. If this work is conducted, it will be important to remember that
universal robustness is a key feature of this attack, and that this feature must be
maintained in the targeted attack.
It is also unclear how well this work extends to object detection models. Researchers
should explore the effectiveness of this attack against object detection models to
determine whether this attack is effective against only classification models or whether
these attacks extend to detection models.
Additionally, researchers should explore the effectiveness of this attack against nonmappable objects. As traffic signs are stationary, they can be easily mapped; however,
non-mappable objects such as pedestrians might be susceptible to this attack.
Finally, occlusion analysis should be used to train better models. The occlusion
analysis featured in Chapter 7 indicates that models focus on limited key features.
In the case of stop signs, these features seem to poorly represent the target class.
This is important not only to defend against this novel attack, but to defend better
against adversarial examples. After all, as researchers have already suggested, the
best defense against adversarial examples will not be a particular defense mechanism,
but rather a more robust model that better interprets the target distributions.
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